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ASSUMED DANGEROUS UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECT IN ALLEGING
GANG AFFILIATION AT BAIL HEARINGS
INTRODUCTION
Dusti Proffit, a black, seventeen-year-old male from Schaumburg,
Illinois, understands what it means to be assumed dangerous.1  Proffit,
who works at a public library, has been pulled over by police five
times within a single year.2  During one of the stops, the police
searched his vehicle and questioned him about guns, drugs, and gang
affiliation.3  His mother fears, though she has no way of verifying, that
her son’s name is wrongly contained within the Schaumburg police’s
gang database.4
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, media reports in the United States
stoked fears of increasing violent crime committed by young offend-
ers.5  In particular, the ideas that gangs had developed organization-
ally, “become more violent,” and “pose[d] a unique threat” to society
gained traction.6  Despite the fact that youth crime rates in the United
States have dropped to nearly their lowest level in three decades,
“public concern and media coverage of gang activity has skyrocketed
since 2000.”7  This fear has been magnified by policymakers who asso-
ciate gangs with many of the most pressing law enforcement and na-
tional security threats facing the nation.8  To allay the popular fear of
violent crime, policymakers have prioritized suppressing gangs.  This
law-and-order approach to gangs is highlighted by the fact that the
federal and state governments have spent much more money on law
enforcement tactics directed toward gangs than on programs aiming to
1. See Danielle Gordon, The Usual Suspects, CHI. REP., Sept. 1998, at 1, 5.
2. Id. at 1.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 5.
5. Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Demonizing Youth, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 747, 753
(2001).
6. Id. at 758 (quoting Proposition 21, §§ 1(h), 2(b), in CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, GEN-
ERAL ELECTION 119 (Mar. 7, 2000)).
7. JUDITH GREENE & KEVIN PRANIS, JUSTICE POLICY INST., GANG WARS: THE FAILURE OF
ENFORCEMENT TACTICS AND THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE PUBLIC SAFETY STRATEGIES 3 (2007),
available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/07-07_REP_GangWars_GC-PS-AC-JJ.
pdf.
8. See id.
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prevent youth from joining gangs and improve conditions in the com-
munities most affected by gang violence.9
Law enforcement agencies collect and disseminate information as a
means to better understand and, ultimately, suppress gang activity.  In
furtherance of this strategy, agencies in many jurisdictions have cre-
ated and maintained databases to store information about gang mem-
bers and gang activity.10  The information stored in these databases is
available to prosecutors to implicate the character of defendants by
alleging that they are gang members, which is often relevant to sen-
tence enhancements.11  Often, a prosecutor will first offer evidence
that a defendant is documented as a gang member in a criminal
database at the defendant’s bail hearing.12  Doing so generally
prompts the judge to impose higher bail, forcing the defendant to re-
main detained until the case is disposed.13  This is significant because
pretrial detention typically has a profound impact on the ultimate dis-
position of a case, usually to the defendant’s detriment.14
The potential for an allegation of documented gang affiliation to
impact the outcome of a case is problematic because there are serious
questions about the accuracy of the information in gang databases.15
Critics contend that the lists of suspected gang members in criminal
databases are contaminated with the names of persons who are not
members of gangs.16  Further, there is evidence that gang databases
disproportionately identify African-Americans and Latinos as gang
members, while they are underinclusive of white gang members.17
Thus, gang databases contain unreliable information that has a sub-
stantial effect on the criminal justice system.18
In light of this unfairness, the Fourteenth Amendment should pro-
hibit prosecutors from offering at bail hearings evidence that a defen-
dant is documented in a criminal database as a suspected gang
member.  Consideration of such evidence unconstitutionally burdens a
defendant’s right to a fair trial.19  Therefore, if gang membership is
relevant to a bail determination, prosecutors should only be permitted
9. GREENE & PRANIS, supra note 7, at 3.
10. See infra notes 58–69 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 168–188 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 189–209 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 82–119 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 82–119 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 102–108 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 168–213 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 239–273 and accompanying text.
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to introduce the corroborating evidence of gang affiliation, without
mention of a defendant’s documented status in a gang database.20
Part II of this Comment discusses the public perception of gangs in
the United States and the law enforcement proposals arising from that
perception,21 with a focus on the maintenance and use of gang
databases as a law enforcement tool.22  Part III examines the constitu-
tional implication of an allegation at a bail hearing that a defendant is
listed in a criminal database as a gang member.23  Part IV discusses
the impact that prohibiting such allegations at bail hearings would
have on the criminal justice process, and Part V concludes.
II. BACKGROUND
Law enforcement agencies have focused attention and resources on
suppressing gangs in response to popularized notions about the extent
to which gangs are responsible for violence occurring in American
communities.24  One common product of this response has been the
creation of gang databases developed and implemented according to
these perceptions of the “gang problem.”25  As a result of agency poli-
cies for identifying and monitoring suspected gang affiliates, many in-
dividuals have been labeled gang members—and therefore
dangerous—after being entered into such databases.26  This label
often follows a person caught in the criminal justice system, possibly
implicating the Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial.27
A. Perception of the “Gang Problem” Versus Reality
While there are many ways to think about and understand gangs,
the general public in the United States regards gang activity as an es-
pecially dangerous subclass of crime.28  Associating gangs with many
of the more noteworthy forms of crime has helped create a number of
myths about gangs and their relation to crime in this country.29  In a
2007 report about statistics and law enforcement approaches regard-
ing gangs, the Justice Policy Institute provided a list of some of the
20. See infra notes 274–292 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 28–120 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 61–120 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 163–273 and accompanying text.
24. GREENE & PRANIS, supra note 7, at 69.
25. Beres & Griffith, supra note 5, at 759–60.
26. K. Babe Howell, Fear Itself: The Impact of Allegations of Gang Affiliation on Pre-Trial
Detention, 23 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 620, 623–24 (2011).
27. Id. at 659.
28. GREENE & PRANIS, supra note 7, at 51.
29. Id.
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common myths about gangs and crime, including the following beliefs:
(1) “[m]ost or all gang members are hardened criminals”; (2) “[g]ang
members spend most of their time planning or committing crimes”;
(3) “[g]ang members are responsible for the bulk of violent crime”;
and (4) “[g]angs largely organize and direct the criminal activity of
their members.”30
While the Justice Policy Institute acknowledges that these myths
may accurately describe a select few gangs and gang members, re-
search indicates that the majority of gang crimes are not centrally di-
rected.31  Rather, when gang crime does take place, it is more typical
for individual members or small groups to commit crimes “on an ad
hoc basis.”32  The Justice Policy Institute posits that the following set
of statements more accurately describes the relationship between
gangs and crime than do the popular myths: (1) there are wide diver-
gences in the “seriousness and extent of criminal involvement” of in-
dividual gang members; (2) even gang members who are involved in
criminal activity “spend most of their time in noncriminal pursuits”;
(3) only a small proportion of all crime, including violent crime, is
committed by gang members; and (4) when gang members commit
crime, it is often “self-initiated and is meant to serve personal rather
than gang interests.”33  These assertions are supported by statistics
that reveal that gang members commit less than 25% of drug sales,
less than 10% of homicides, and less than 7% of violent crimes in the
United States.34  Even these percentages distort the role of gangs, as
many of the crimes committed by gang members are intended to ben-
efit the individuals who commit them, and not the gangs they belong
to.35
These common misperceptions of gangs also fail to account for the
distinct subgroups that exist within gangs.36  While “hard-core” gang
members are responsible for most gang delinquency, “affiliates” iden-
tify with the gang but are less committed to gang violence.37  Fringe
members—“wannabes”— refrain from getting involved in gang vio-
lence entirely, despite claiming gang affiliation, wearing gang colors,
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. GREENE & PRANIS, supra note 7, at 61.
35. Id.
36. See Suzin Kim, Note, Gangs and Law Enforcement: The Necessity of Limiting the Use of
Gang Profiles, 5 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 265, 268 (1996).
37. Id.
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and associating with gang members.38  According to many researchers,
the reality is that “most gang members are more talk than action.”39
There are many possible explanations for why the public holds such
a perception of the role of gangs and their members in the crime and
violence problems in this country.  “Graffiti, colors, hand signs, and
dramatic rivalries” often make gang members “highly visible,” which
in turn makes gang activity “more memorable and more newsworthy”
than other types of crime.40  Television news outlets embrace gang sto-
ries because they are easy to report and generate viewer interest.41
Law enforcement and the media’s reporting on gangs, in which all
gang activity is discussed as criminal activity, suggest that gangs are
nothing more than criminal organizations.42  The media often depicts
gangs so as to imply that they are “powerful, hierarchical armies,”
while only faintly acknowledging that this is not the case.43  Law en-
forcement and the media also tend to associate the entire gang with
“any crime for which an alleged gang member stands convicted,
charged, or even suspected.”44  Doing so enforces the idea that every
gang member has committed an extensive list of shocking crimes.45
“[Because] the media has placed its attention exclusively on the vio-
lent and criminal behavior of gang members, rather than on other
noncriminal aspects of gang membership, public perception of gangs is
distorted.”46
B. Defining Gangs and Gang Crime
For all of the attention that gangs receive, there is no general agree-
ment as to what precisely constitutes a gang.47  An exact definition
depends on the purpose for creating the definition; people who study
gangs for different purposes will naturally develop different defini-
38. Id. at 268–69.
39. GREENE & PRANIS, supra note 7, at 61.
40. Id.
41. Kim, supra note 36, at 269.  One reporter explains that once the police or a witness de-
scribe a criminal act as “gang-related,” the news organization can report it as such without hav-
ing to do any more significant investigative work. Id. (citing WILLIAM B. SANDERS, GANGBANGS
AND DRIVE-BYS: GROUNDED CULTURE AND JUVENILE GANG VIOLENCE 286–87 (1994)).
42. See GREENE & PRANIS, supra note 7, at 61.
43. Kim, supra note 36, at 270.
44. GREENE & PRANIS, supra note 7, at 61.
45. Id.
46. Kim, supra note 36, at 270.  Many young people are drawn to gangs because gangs can
serve as a source of recreation, physical protection, and group identity. Id. at 266–67.
47. GREENE & PRANIS, supra note 7, at 9.
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tions.48  One prominent gang researcher, Frederic Thrasher, defines
“ganging” as “a normal peer activity for adolescents within a contin-
uum of behaviors that range ‘from conventional to wild.’”49  Other
experts posit that criminal activity is essential to defining gangs.50  An-
other definition characterizes gangs as “unsupervised peer groups who
are socialized by the streets rather than by conventional institu-
tions.”51  The legal definitions in most states tend to focus on inten-
tional criminal activity, saying very little about associational elements
specific to gangs.52
Under the California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention
(STEP) Act, a “criminal street gang” is defined as follows:
any ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more
persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary
activities the commission of one or more . . . criminal acts[,] . . .
having a common name or common identifying sign or symbol, and
whose members individually or collectively engage in or have en-
gaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.53
The STEP Act goes on to define “pattern of criminal gang activity” as:
the commission of, attempted commission of, conspiracy to commit,
or solicitation of, sustained juvenile petition for, or conviction of
two or more [specified offenses], provided . . . the last of those of-
fenses occurred within three years after a prior offense, and the of-
fenses were committed on separate occasions, or by two or more
persons.54
Many, but not all, of the specified crimes involve violence or fire-
arms.55  California’s definition of a criminal street gang is typical of
other states that statutorily define street gangs.56  As states have em-
phasized criminal activity in defining gangs, it is not surprising that
48. See Kim, supra note 36, at 266.  For example, a sociologist’s definition of a gang will be
different from a law enforcement gang expert’s definition because they have different purposes
for studying gangs and, therefore, focus on different aspects of gangs. See id.
49. GREENE & PRANIS, supra note 7, at 9 (quoting John Hagedorn, Gang Violence in the
Postindustrial Era, 24 CRIME & JUST. 365, 367 (1998)).
50. Id.
51. Id. (quoting Hagedorn, supra note 49, at 367).
52. Id.
53. Rebecca Rader Brown, Note, The Gang’s All Here: Evaluating the Need for a National
Gang Database, 42 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 293, 306 (2009) (alterations in original) (quoting
CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(e)–(f) (West 2006)).
54. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(e).
55. The attempt or commission of two enumerated crimes constitutes a “pattern of criminal
activity.”  Among the enumerated crimes are: assault with a deadly weapon or by means of force
likely to produce great bodily injury; unlawful homicide or manslaughter; arson; and intimida-
tion of a witness. See id. § 186.22(e)(1)–(33).
56. Illinois defines a street gang as “any combination . . . of [three] or more persons . . . that
. . . engage[] in a course or pattern of criminal activity.”  740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 147/10 (2012).  To
fall within Colorado’s definition of a criminal street gang, an organization must have “members
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policymakers have committed to focusing more intensely on gangs,
enhancing police activity in high-crime areas, and imposing harsher
criminal justice sanctions on alleged gang members.57
C. Gang Databases
Fear of violent youth crime in the 1980s and 1990s formed the basis
for an approach to crime control that focused on harsh punishments.58
This fear is why gang suppression tactics have become the most popu-
lar approach to dealing with gangs throughout the nation.59  Common
suppression tactics include forming special gang units in police depart-
ments, aggressively policing high-crime neighborhoods, and targeting
alleged gang members with severe criminal punishments.60  Many law
enforcement agencies create gang databases to facilitate gang suppres-
sion tactics.61  These databases store information that law enforce-
ment officers collect regarding gangs, gang members, and gang
activity.62
Across the nation, law enforcement agencies and officials have in-
creasingly relied on gang databases in carrying out gang suppression
tactics.63  Generally, databases contain lists of suspected gang mem-
bers’ names, along with other personal information such as individu-
als’ photographs, gang affiliations, gang monikers, addresses, and
identifying marks or tattoos.64  The maintenance of gang databases re-
flects a law enforcement trend that emphasizes the importance of col-
lecting and disseminating data regarding criminal conduct.65  The
accumulation of information in a database facilitates information
sharing between various law enforcement agencies within a region.66
[who] individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activ-
ity.” COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-23-101(1)(b) (2012).
57. See GREENE & PRANIS, supra note 7, at 67.
58. Beres & Griffith, supra note 5, at 753–54.  Youth crime rates rose in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, and the media responded with warnings that a new type of dangerous criminal was
emerging in American society.  Id. at 753.  These warnings were embraced by policy makers at
the state and national levels who advanced measures to get tougher on crime. See id. at 754.
59. Brown, supra note 53, at 295.  Despite proof that prevention and intervention tactics have
been successful, most legislation and government funds (both at the state and national levels) are
still directed toward suppressing gang activity. Id.  Studies of suppression tactics and crime rates
in different jurisdictions have shown “divergent trends.” Id.
60. GREENE & PRANIS, supra note 7, at 67.
61. Brown, supra note 53;, at 296.
62. Id.
63. Beres & Griffith, supra note 5, at 759.
64. Id. at 759–60.
65. See Brown, supra note 53, at 298.
66. Id.  Supporters of increased information sharing across law enforcement agencies argue
that the practice helps prevent and suppress crime by promoting awareness of patterns in crimi-
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One purpose of gang databases is to enable a prosecutor to allege at a
bail hearing that the defendant is documented by a law enforcement
agency as a suspected gang member.67  As will be discussed, doing so
can significantly affect the remainder of the criminal justice process
for a defendant.68  The impact such an allegation can have on a case
places particular importance on the process by which information is
collected and entered into databases and, more importantly, the accu-
racy of that information.69
1. Collecting Information
Most of the information documented in gang databases is collected
from individual documentation of field interviews.70  Individual docu-
mentation charts individuals who are known or suspected gang mem-
bers, and law enforcement officers use the information to identify
subsequent gang crimes and impose enhanced sentences on docu-
mented individuals who are convicted of crimes.71  Field interviews
are conducted during consensual police stops in which officers make
contact with known or suspected gang members.72  These stops are
usually unrelated to any particular incident or investigation.73  After
questioning an individual about his gang affiliation, monikers, and tat-
toos, the officer will record the information on a field interview card,
noting the location of the stop, the vehicles involved, and where the
individual lives and attends school.74
nal activity, publicizing best practices, and improving resource allocation. Id.  “In addition to
gangs, law enforcement agencies use databases to track convicted sex offenders and suspected
terrorists.” Id.  However, sex offender databases and gang databases differ significantly in that a
person “must be charged and convicted of a sex offense in order to be added to the sex offender
registry.” Id. at 299 (citing Adam Walsh Act, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 111(1), 120 Stat. 587, 591
(2006)).  As discussed later, an individual can be entered into a gang database without even
being charged with a crime, much less convicted. See infra notes 75–81 and accompanying text.
67. See Howell, supra note 26, at 640–41.
68. See infra notes 168–205 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 185–188 and accompanying text.
70. See Joshua D. Wright, The Constitutional Failure of Gang Databases, 2 STAN. J. C.R. &
C.L. 115, 120 (2005).
71. Brown, supra note 53, at 302.
72. Wright, supra note 70, at 120–21.
73. Brown, supra note 53, at 305 (citing Charles M. Katz, Issues in the Production and Dissem-
ination of Gang Statistics: An Ethnographic Study of a Large Midwestern Police Gang Unit, 49
CRIME & DELINQ. 485, 497 (2003)).
74. Wright, supra note 70, at 121.
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2. Criteria for Entry
Law enforcement jurisdictions have criteria used by patrol officers
to identify and document suspected gang members.75  California’s cri-
teria for identifying gang members consist of the following indicators
and personal characteristics: (1) admission of gang membership; (2)
regular association with known gang members; (3) tattoos indicating
gang affiliation; (4) clothing or symbols reflective of a specific gang;
(5) use of gang-related hand signs or presence in a photograph with
known gang members; (6) presence of a person’s name on a gang doc-
ument, hit list, or graffiti; (7) accusation of gang membership by a reli-
able source; (8) subject of an arrest with identified gang members; (9)
correspondence to or from known gang members about gang activity;
and (10) responsibility for gang graffiti.76
After patrol officers record their observations from consensual
stops on field interview cards, they submit the cards to the law en-
forcement agency’s gang unit for review.77  The gang unit, following
jurisdictional criteria for entry, then enters individuals into the
database as suspected gang members.78  While law enforcement agen-
cies create their own requirements for entering an individual’s name
into a database and designating him as a suspected gang member, of-
ficers in some California jurisdictions may enter a person into the Cal-
ifornia gang database for meeting as few as two of the criteria.79
Texas provides for similar documentation criteria statutorily, also al-
lowing entry into its gang database for individuals who satisfy any two
of the criteria.80  For example, a person “wearing baggy pants who is
seen chatting with a person who is already (rightly or wrongly) in the
gang database [could] be added to the database.”81
3. Inaccuracies
Examples of individuals who, like Dusti Proffit, believe that they
were wrongly documented as gang members in police databases illus-
trate ways in which erroneous documentation can occur and the im-
pact that it can have.  In 1993, high school students Quyen Pham,
Annie Lee, and Minh Tram Tran were stopped by police while walk-
75. Brown, supra note 53, at 306.
76. Id. at 306–07.
77. Id. at 306.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 306–07.
80. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 61.02(C) (West 2006 & Supp. 2013).
81. Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Gangs, Schools and Stereotypes, 37 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 935, 949 (2004).
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ing down a public street in Garden Grove, California.82  The three
girls were heading toward a public telephone to call for a ride home
from a cafe´ at around seven o’clock in the evening.83  The police ac-
cused the three girls—who were Asian and dressed in baggy cloth-
ing—of being gang members.84  When the girls vehemently denied the
accusation, one of the officers told them that “if you walk like a duck
and talk like a duck, then you must be a duck.”85  Despite not charg-
ing the girls with any crime related to the stop, the police photo-
graphed them and documented their physical characteristics, home
addresses, and schools they attended.86  Tran was stopped by police
and accused of being a gang member a second time about six months
later.87  Again, she was not charged with any crime.88
Similarly, Daniel C., a sixteen year-old student, was placed on his
school’s gang list for wearing gold and black—the colors of the Latin
Kings street gang—to school during his freshman year.89  According
to Daniel, he was not a member of the Latin Kings, but wore the col-
ors in hopes of dissuading other students from harming him.90  Even
though he never wore the colors after being disciplined, his name re-
mained on the school’s gang list.91  Daniel was later summoned to
court on a misdemeanor charge after a classmate alleged that Daniel
threatened and “harassed” him.92  At the bail hearing, the prosecutor
told the judge that Daniel was identified in the police gang database
as a Latin Kings affiliate.93  The judge set Daniel’s bail at $20,000 de-
spite the fact that Daniel denied ever being in a gang, had no criminal
record, and showed up voluntarily in court.94  After the bail hearing,
Daniel’s attorney conducted an investigation confirming that the com-
plainant in the case was suspended for harassing Daniel, who was ac-
tually the victim.95  Based on this investigation, the judge reduced
82. Doreen Carvajal, O.C. Girl Challenges Police Photo Policy, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 1994, at
A1.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Carvajal, supra note 82.
89. Howell, supra note 26, at 627–28.  “Daniel C.” is not the real name of the subject of this
story, but rather a pseudonym concocted by Professor Howell to protect the teen’s identity. Id.
at 627 n.34.
90. Id. at 628.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 627.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Howell, supra note 26, at 627–28.
2014] ASSUMED DANGEROUS 1037
Daniel’s bail to $3,000, which Daniel’s parents were able to post after
Daniel remained in jail for five days.96  The charges against Daniel
were eventually dropped following a year of litigation.97
A few months later, Daniel was arrested again on charges that
would eventually be dropped.98  Again, the prosecutor claimed at the
bail hearing that Daniel was a gang member based solely on the inclu-
sion of Daniel’s name on the gang database list.99  The judge set
Daniel’s bail at $50,000, the amount requested by the prosecutor.100
This time, Daniel refused to plead guilty and remained in jail for a
month on a felony charge that was ultimately dismissed.101
a. Racial Disparities
Hispanic and African-American males comprise the overwhelming
majority of entries in gang databases,102 despite estimates from gang
researchers that 40% of gang members are white.103  This phenome-
non is illustrated by a 1992 report from the Los Angeles district attor-
ney that contained a list of 58,000 Hispanic gang members and 37,000
black gang members, but only 358 “[m]isc./white” gang members.104
Similarly, Denver police alleged that “more than two-thirds of the
young black males in [Denver] were gang members.”105  The dispro-
portionately high representation of blacks and Latinos in gang
databases is unsurprising given that suppression tactics are generally
concentrated in inner-city neighborhoods.106  A study conducted in
the late 1990s through 2000 on police–community relations in Wash-
ington, D.C., a majority-black city with a majority-black police force,
revealed that young black men were three times more likely to be
stopped by police than young white men.107  Aggressive policing of
poor inner-city neighborhoods leads to a disproportionately high
number of field interviews conducted on minorities.108  Considering
96. Id. at 628.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 628–30.
99. Id. at 628.
100. Id. at 629.
101. Howell, supra note 26, at 630.
102. Beres & Griffith, supra note 81, at 948; see also Howell, supra note 26, at 621.
103. Howell, supra note 26, at 621 (citing GREEN & PRANIS, supra note 7, at 37).
104. Beres & Griffith, supra note 81, at 948 (citing IRA REINER, OFFICE OF THE DIST. ATTOR-
NEY, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, GANGS, CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN LOS ANGELES 110 tbl.I
(1992)).
105. Id. at 951.
106. See id. at 949.
107. Ronald Weitzer et al., Police–Community Relations in a Majority-Black City, 45 J. RES.
CRIME & DELINQ. 398, 413 (2008).
108. Beres & Griffith, supra note 81, at 949.
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that field interviews are the initial step in entering individuals into
gang databases, the high number of field interviews conducted on mi-
norities helps explain the disproportionately high inclusion of minori-
ties in gang database lists.
b. Flaws in Documentation Procedures
Documentation in field interviews is not performed by anti-gang
unit personnel, but rather by patrol officers who generally lack spe-
cialized training on how to identify gang members that gang unit of-
ficers receive.109  Considering the vague nature of many of the gang
membership indicators, there is ample room to misidentify a person as
a gang member.110  Many local agencies have not implemented proce-
dures that call for field interview cards to be reviewed by gang detec-
tives to ensure that there is sufficient evidence to enter a person’s
name into the database.111  Even in instances in which police depart-
ments have established review procedures, often those procedures are
not followed, contributing to inaccuracies within databases.112  De-
spite the possibility of being wrongfully identified and documented as
suspected gang members in criminal databases, individuals  are not
entitled to be notified that they have been documented or to challenge
the designation.113
“Proper purging procedures” are also important for the accuracy of
databases because gang membership is constantly in flux.114  Most
young people who join gangs remain involved in the gang for a year or
less.115  Yet, most agencies are only required to remove inactive gang
members from the criminal database lists every two to five years.116
As with review procedures, agencies often do not comply with purging
procedures, neglecting to remove inactive members within the re-
quired timeline.117  There is a lack of external oversight and pressure
to fulfill purging requirements because individuals usually do not
109. Wright, supra note 70, at 121 (citing Katz, supra note 73, at 497).
110. It is easy to see how a person who is not a gang member could nonetheless fall within
many of the law enforcement indicators of gang membership.  For example, the indicators do not
provide guidance to the patrol officer regarding how to distinguish between a person who is
deliberately wearing gang colors to signify membership and a person who happens to be dressed
in a color commonly associated with a gang. See supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text.
111. See Brown, supra note 53, at 319–20.
112. See Wright, supra note 70, at 122.
113. Id. at 118.  Many police departments contend that an individual should not have the right
to know whether he is documented as a gang member. Id.
114. Brown, supra note 53, at 320.
115. GREENE & PRANIS, supra note 7, at 79; see also Brown, supra note 53, at 320.
116. Brown, supra note 53, at 320.
117. Id.; see also Wright, supra note 70, at 123.
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know that they are documented as gang members.118  Thus, police are
able to retain names in their databases at little or no cost in the hopes
that the information will be of some future value.119  In some in-
stances, grants can create incentives for agencies to maintain
databases that are overinclusive by basing funding on an agency’s abil-
ity to show that it has a serious gang problem in its jurisdiction.120
D. Dangerousness as a Bail Consideration
A prosecutor may allege at a bail hearing that the defendant is doc-
umented as a suspected gang member because a judge is permitted to
consider the threat of danger the defendant may pose to the commu-
nity if released pretrial.121  Historically, the risk of flight was the sole
basis for denying bail.122  Congress passed the Bail Reform Act of
1966 to promote pretrial release of defendants.123  That law “required
federal courts to release any defendant charged with a non-capital
crime on his or her recognizance or an unsecured appearance
bond.”124  The statute provided an exception to pretrial release only if
the court had reason to believe that the defendant would not appear
in court for trial.125
The 1970s and 1980s saw an implementation of a more punitive jus-
tice system in the United States in response to concerns raised by sta-
tistics regarding recidivism among criminal defendants on conditional
release.126  These fears were reflected in the 1984 Bail Reform Act,
which replaced the 1966 Act.127  The 1984 Bail Reform Act called for
consideration of future dangerousness of defendants when determin-
ing bail, a factor not contemplated by its predecessor.128  This concern
for the future dangerousness of defendants who could potentially be
118. Wright, supra note 70, at 123.
119. Id.
120. Brown, supra note 53, at 320 (citing Katz, supra note 73, at 489).
121. See Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, Punishment, & the
Sixth Amendment, 69 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1297, 1330–32 (2012).
122. Id. at 1328.
123. Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214, repealed by Bail Reform Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 203, 98 Stat. 1837, 1976; see also Marcia Johnson & Luckett
Anthony Johnson, Bail: Reforming Policies to Address Overcrowded Jails, the Impact of Race on
Detention, and Community Revival in Harris County, Texas, 7 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 42, 59
(2012).
124. Johnson & Johnson, supra note 123, at 59.
125. Id.
126. Bail Reform Act of 1984 §§ 202–10, 98 Stat. at 1976–87 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 3141–50 (2012)); see also Candace McCoy, Caleb Was Right: Pretrial Decisions Deter-
mine Mostly Everything, 12 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 135, 141 (2007).
127. Appleman, supra note 121, at 1330.
128. Id.
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released to await trial is still present in the statute governing such de-
cisions.129  A federal court is prohibited from releasing a defendant if
it determines that doing so “will not reasonably assure the appearance
of the person as required or will endanger the safety of any other per-
son or the community.”130  Since the passage of the 1984 Bail Reform
Act, most states have followed suit in precluding or limiting pretrial
release when a judge determines that release will pose a danger to the
community.131
Congress did include some due process safeguards in the 1984 Bail
Reform Act by entitling a defendant to a hearing before a federal
court may require pretrial detention.132  At such a hearing, the defen-
dant has “the right to be represented by counsel, . . . to testify, to
present witnesses, and to cross-examine witnesses.”133  During the
hearing, judges are to consider the “nature and circumstances of the
offense charged,” the strength of the evidence against the defendant,
the defendant’s personal history and characteristics, and “the nature
and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that
would be posed by the person’s release.”134  If, in considering these
factors, a judge determines that no conditions will guarantee the
safety of any other person or the community, he must order that the
defendant remain detained before trial.135
Despite the due process safeguards available to a defendant, there
are characteristics of the hearing procedure that inherently limit a de-
fendant’s ability to defend one’s self against an accusation that he
would pose a risk of danger if released.136  First, judges are given dis-
cretion to decide “what constitutes a fair and sufficient pretrial deten-
129. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b), (e).
130. See id. § 3142(b).
131. Appleman, supra note 121, at 1330.  Forty-five states and the District of Columbia cur-
rently allow pretrial detention based on a determination that the defendant is dangerous. Id.  At
least thirty-four have done so by statutory provision. Id.
132. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f).
133. Id.
134. Id. § 3142(g).
135. Id. § 3142(e).
136. See id.  The hearing is to be “held immediately upon the defendant’s first appearance
before the [judge],” leaving virtually no time to procure evidence in support of an argument that
the defendant does not pose a threat of danger. Id.  While the defendant can request a continu-
ance, the continuance may not exceed five days. Id. During that time, the defendant must re-
main detained, which prevents him from personally meeting with witnesses and gathering his
own evidence. Id.  Additionally, the prosecutor is not required to notify the defendant that the
prosecution may seek pretrial detention based on the defendant’s prior behavior, further exacer-
bating the difficulties the defendant faces. See Appleman, supra note 121, at 1331.
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tion hearing.”137  Another issue with such hearings is that the inquiry
into whether a defendant is dangerous often takes into account specu-
lative and unproven factors.138  The weight of the evidence against the
defendant is one factor a judge is required to weigh,139 but the judge is
not required to find that the evidence sufficiently demonstrates a
strong possibility that the defendant is in fact guilty.140  Further, there
are issues regarding the reliability of the evidence produced by the
government because the criminal trial rules concerning the admissibil-
ity of evidence explicitly do not apply to pretrial detention hearings.141
Not only does the protocol of a pretrial detention hearing place the
defendant at a disadvantage, but the insufficiency of information that
is common in such hearings can also work to the defendant’s detri-
ment.142  Such a hearing requires significant investigative work from
both the prosecution and the defense, and the practical realities of
conducting such investigations often result in a “paucity of evidence”
on which the judge can base his decision.143  Yet, as American society
has become increasingly victim-centered and focused on public safety
threats, arguments that a defendant is dangerous have a much greater
probability of success in court.144  The natural tendency is for judges,
who are not immune to the fears and pressures that grew out of the
law-and-order movement, to order the pretrial detainment of defend-
ants without some reasonable assurance that such decisions will not
yield adverse ramifications.145  The insufficiency of the information
available often precludes judges from finding the reasonable assur-
ance needed before they are willing to release defendants.146
E. The Fourteenth Amendment
Detaining some defendants before trial while releasing others may
implicate Fourteenth Amendment concerns.  The Equal Protection
137. S. Molly Chaudhuri, Bail or Jail? The Dangerous Dilemma of Determining Future Dan-
gerousness, BOS. B.J., Sept./Oct. 1995, at 16, 19.
138. Johnson & Johnson, supra note 123, at 60.  The nature and circumstances of the offense
charged can weigh in favor of detaining a defendant despite the obvious reality that the person
has not yet been convicted of the offense.  The nature and seriousness of the danger that would
be posed by the person’s release is a speculative assessment.
139. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(2).
140. Appleman, supra note 121, at 1331.
141. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f).
142. See Chaudhuri, supra note 137, at 19.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 18.
145. McCoy, supra note 126, at 142 (citing John Goldcamp, Judicial Discretion and Bail Re-
form: Lessons from Philadelphia’s Evidence-Based Judicial Strategy, in STUDIES IN LAW, POLIT-
ICS AND SOCIETY (Austin Sarat ed., 2008)).
146. See Chaudhuri, supra note 137, at 19.
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment dictates that “all persons simi-
larly circumstanced shall be treated alike.”147  Additionally, the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause offers “heightened
protection against government interference with certain fundamental
rights and liberty interests.”148  Among those fundamental rights and
liberties are many of the specific individual freedoms enumerated in
the Bill of Rights.149
Courts have developed standards for determining the validity of
state legislation or other official action that is challenged as violating
the Equal Protection Clause.150  In making such a determination, the
courts look to the nature of the distinction made by the policy, the
interests the state is puportedly protecting, and the interests of those
burdened by the classification.151  Legislation and official action are
generally presumed to be valid and will be upheld if the classification
drawn by the policy is “rationally related to a legitimate state inter-
est.”152  However, state policies that classify individuals by race, alien-
age, or religion are subjected to “strict scrutiny,” under which they
will be upheld only if they are narrowly tailored to achieve a compel-
ling government interest.153  Distinctions based on these factors elicit
the most exacting scrutiny because they are rarely related to achieving
any legitimate state goals and often reflect prejudice.154
This equal protection analysis also requires strict scrutiny of state
acts that impinge on constitutionally protected personal rights to pre-
vent “invidious discriminations” from being “made against groups or
types of individuals in violation of the constitutional guaranty of just
and equal laws.”155  A law that “lays an unequal hand” upon a particu-
lar group by infringing on a fundamental right without a compelling
justification for doing so makes “as invidious a discrimination as if it
had selected a particular race or nationality for oppressive treat-
ment.”156  In such cases, the Equal Protection Clause functions simi-
larly to the Due Process Clause, as due process prohibits the
147. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253
U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
148. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).
149. Id.  The Supreme Court has extended the Due Process Clause to also protect the “funda-
mental rights and liberties which are . . . ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’” Id. at
720–21 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325–26 (1937)).
150. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439–40 (1985).
151. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968).
152. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
156. Id.
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government from any intrusion on fundamental liberty interests “un-
less the intrusion is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.”157
Supreme Court decisions regarding access to judicial processes have
reflected concerns for due process of law and equal protection of the
laws.158  In Griffin v. Illinois, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
the Constitution guarantees a right to a fair trial.159  Based on that
guarantee, the Court held that the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses precluded the state of Illinois, which provides a right to appel-
late review, from denying review to criminal defendants who could
not afford to purchase their trial transcript.160  In a similar ruling in
Douglas v. California, the Supreme Court struck down a California
rule of criminal procedure that only provided counsel for indigent
criminal defendants’ appeal of right if the appellate court, based on a
preliminary review of the case, found that the case had merit.161  In
these cases, the Supreme Court found that the Equal Protection
Clause was implicated out of concern for “the legitimacy of fencing
out would-be appellants based solely on their inability to pay . . .
costs,” while the “due process concern homes in on the essential fair-
ness of the . . . proceedings.”162
III. ANALYSIS
An allegation of gang membership can have a prejudicial effect on a
bail decision to the detriment of the defendant,163 which can dramati-
cally affect the course and outcome of a criminal case.164  Thus, the
fairness of a case is dependent on the fairness of the bail proceed-
ing.165  Because the right to a fair trial is a fundamental right protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment, a government action that functions to
the defendant’s detriment at a bail hearing should be subject to strict
judicial scrutiny.166  Given the tenuous link between gang database
criteria and legitimate justifications for imposing exorbitant bail or
157. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S.
292, 302 (1993)).
158. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120 (1996).
159. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956) (plurality opinion).
160. Id. at 19.
161. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963) (reasoning that “[w]hen an indigent is
forced to run this gantlet of a preliminary showing of merit, the right to appeal does not comport
with fair procedure”).
162. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 120.
163. See infra notes 168–188 and accompanying text.
164. See infra notes 189–213 and accompanying text.
165. See infra notes 189–213 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 147–162 and accompanying text.
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withholding bail completely, alleging documentation of gang member-
ship at a bail hearing violates the constitutional guarantee of a fair
trial.
A. The Effect of Gang Membership Accusations on the Right to a
Fair Trial and the Presumption of Innocence
The Constitution guarantees all persons a right to a fair trial, which
is dependent on the presumption of innocence.167  An allegation that a
defendant is documented as a suspected gang member implicates this
guarantee by increasing the likelihood and length of pretrial detention
for the defendant, which prejudicially influences the disposition of the
case.
1. Gang Membership Accusations and Pretrial Detention
Since “dangerousness” has become a relevant consideration in bail
determinations, a prosecutor’s accusation at a bail hearing that a de-
fendant is a gang member will often reduce or eliminate the possibility
that the defendant will be released on his own recognizance or reason-
able bail.168  The likelihood of release diminishes because the allega-
tion of gang membership arouses a perception of violence,169 which
factors into a judge’s determination of dangerousness.  This fear is
often enough to preempt other more traditional considerations that
weigh in favor of releasing the defendant on his own recognizance or
reasonable bail.170
Professor K. Babe Howell conducted a survey of defense attorneys
that illustrates the significant impact that accusations of gang affilia-
tion have at bail hearings.171  Sixty-four defense attorneys answered
questions about the frequency and accuracy of such allegations and
the impact they have on bail determinations.172  Despite some varia-
tion in the results, the participating attorneys’ responses largely
showed that clients who were accused of being gang members were
subjected to higher amounts of bail than defendants charged with sim-
167. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976).
168. Howell, supra note 26, at 621.
169. Id.
170. See id. (arguing that an allegation of gang membership “often reduces or eliminates the
possibility of release on reasonable bail regardless of the merits of the case, . . . the severity of
charges[,] . . . whether or not the defendant has ever been convicted of a crime, and whether or
not the arrest is related to a serious crime or alleged gang activity”).
171. Id. at 631.
172. Id.
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ilar crimes and with similar criminal backgrounds.173  The prevalence
of allegations of gang membership affecting bail in cases involving
only a misdemeanor charge or crimes unrelated to gang activity dem-
onstrates that the allegation itself has a great effect on bail determina-
tions.174  The survey responses made it clear that an allegation at a
bail hearing that the defendant is a gang member often is the reason
defendants remain in jail before standing trial.175
Professor Howell’s survey results are supported by observations of
nearly two thousand arraignments in Brooklyn and Manhattan be-
tween September 2002 and March 2003.176  Based on these observa-
tions, the New York City Criminal Justice Agency found that the
prosecutor’s bail request was the only important factor in determining
bail amount.177  Assuming that prosecutors inflate their bail requests
based on defendants’ documentation as suspected gang members, the
documented status contributes to the imposition of higher bail for de-
fendants listed in gang databases.178  While the researchers found that
prosecutors dominated bail decisions, defense attorneys’ influence on
bail decisions was “negligible.”179
Given the likelihood that an accusation of gang membership will
result in higher bail amounts, statistics regarding the effect of bail on
pretrial detention support the respondents’ indication that such accu-
sations are frequently the reason defendants remain detained until the
case reaches its disposition.180  The New York Criminal Justice
173. Id. at 634.  90% of respondents had observed a gang affiliation accusation at a bail hear-
ing. Id. at 631.  Of those, 90% stated that the allegation led to significantly higher bail or remand
in felony cases, and about two-thirds stated that it led to higher or significantly higher bail in
misdemeanor cases. Id. at 633.
174. Only 14% of the respondents indicated that most or all of the cases in which the prosecu-
tor leveled a gang membership accusation involved a gang-related crime.  Howell, supra note 26,
at 633.  If a judge imposes higher bail in a case where an allegation of gang membership is made
despite the charge being minor and unrelated to gang activity, then the allegation must carry
significant weight in the judge’s decision.  Professor Howell states that it is common not only for
gang membership accusations to lead to higher bail in cases where the crimes charged are minor,
but also in cases where the charges are more serious but the evidence against the defendant is
weak. Id. at 626.
175. Sixty percent of respondents indicated that they had represented clients “who would
have been released had it not been for the allegation of gang affiliation.” Id. at 632.
176. See MARY T. PHILLIPS, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, FACTORS INFLUENCING RE-
LEASE AND BAIL DECISIONS IN NEW YORK CITY: PART 3. CROSS-BOROUGH ANALYSIS 9 (2004).
177. Id. at 39.
178. Prosecutors commonly allege at bail hearings that defendants are documented as sus-
pected gang members to justify higher bail.  Howell, supra note 26, at 632.  Therefore, it is safe to
assume that the prosecutor would factor the defendant’s documented status into the requested
bail amount.
179. PHILLIPS, supra note 176, at 40–41.
180. See generally Mary T. Phillips, Bail, Detention, & Nonfelony Case Outcomes, RES. BRIEF
(N.Y.C. Criminal Justice Agency, New York, N.Y.), May 2007 [hereinafter Phillips, Nonfelony
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Agency conducted a study in 2007 to examine how pretrial detention
affects case outcomes in New York City.181  The results of the study
indicated that bail, regardless of the amount at which it is set, usually
results in some duration of pretrial detention.182  More precisely, there
is a positive correlation between the interval of bail and the length of
pretrial detention.183  In a substantial portion of the cases in New
York City in which bail is set, the defendants remain detained for the
entire duration of the case.184  Thus, if the allegation of gang member-
ship does inflate the amount at which bail is set, the effect of that
allegation is likely to also extend the duration in which the defendant
is detained pretrial—and quite possibly until the case is disposed.
This conclusion is made even more troubling given that 80% of the
respondents in Professor Howell’s survey indicated that allegations of
gang membership had been directed toward defendants who were not
gang members, though evidentiary hearings regarding the allegations
were rarely held.185  This fact is highlighted and explained by prosecu-
tors’ and judges’ heavy reliance on the accuracy of the information
contained in gang databases.186   This reliance, coupled with the gen-
eral dearth of information available to judges in determining whether
a defendant is dangerous, “renders a strain of rough justice”187 in
which an allegation that a person is documented as a gang member in
a law enforcement database, with nothing more, can effectively keep a
defendant detained before and throughout his trial.188
2. Pretrial Detention and Case Outcomes
In addition to the probability that it will lead to higher bail, an alle-
gation at a bail hearing that a defendant is documented in a law en-
forcement database as a gang member is likely to affect the ultimate
Case Outcomes]; Mary T. Phillips, Bail, Detention, & Felony Case Outcomes, RES. BRIEF (N.Y.C.
Criminal Justice Agency, New York, N.Y.), Sept. 2008 [hereinafter Phillips, Felony Case
Outcomes].
181. Phillips, Nonfelony Case Outcomes, supra note 180, at 2.
182. Id.
183. This is true for felony cases in New York City, see Phillips, Felony Case Outcomes, supra
note 180, at 4, and misdemeanor cases in New York City. See Phillips, Nonfelony Case Out-
comes, supra note 180, at 2.
184. In felony cases, 31% of defendants held on bail remained in detention until disposition.
Phillips, Felony Case Outcomes, supra note 180, at 2.  In misdemeanor cases, nearly half (48%)
of the defendants held on bail remained in detention throughout the duration of the case.  Phil-
lips, Nonfelony Case Outcomes, supra note 180, at 4.
185. Howell, supra note 26, at 632.  Only one-fifth of the respondents reported that gang
membership accusations were given evidentiary review. Id.
186. See Wright, supra note 70, at 117.
187. Chaudhuri, supra note 137, at 19.
188. See Howell, supra note 26, at 632.
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disposition of the case.189  There is a substantial correlation between
pretrial release and likelihood of later acquittal.190  Conversely, as was
demonstrated in the New York Criminal Justice Agency study, the
probability of conviction increases the longer a defendant is detained
before trial.191  Pretrial detention not only affects a defendant’s
chances of acquittal or conviction, but it also has an impact on the
severity of the sentence imposed in the event of a conviction.192
The effect of pretrial detention on a case outcome is the natural and
logical consequence of taking a defendant out of his normal life and
depriving him of his liberty.193  Defendants who are detained while
awaiting trial are confined in jails that are often overcrowded with
deplorable conditions, and in some cases, are “more oppressive than
the than the jail cells in which our convicted felons reside.”194  These
conditions can be particularly oppressive to a defendant accused of
being in a gang, as some jails segregate alleged gang members and
place them in lockdown for up to twenty-three hours a day.195  One of
the major ways in which pretrial detention may affect the final disposi-
tion of a case is by placing pressure on a defendant to plead guilty.196
Statistics demonstrate that a substantial portion of criminal cases are
disposed of with guilty pleas and illustrate the vast number of cases in
which this phenomenon may be at work.197  This pressure to plead
189. See id. at 635.
190. McCoy, supra note 126, at 143.
191. In felony cases, the CJA study revealed an overall conviction rate of 68%.  Phillips, Fel-
ony Case Outcomes, supra note 180, at 5.  That rate jumped to 85% for defendants who were
detained for longer than a week. Id.  For defendants who spent less than one day in pretrial
detention, the conviction rate in felony cases was only 59%. Id.  Not only did pretrial detention
increase the probability of conviction in felony cases, but it “also lessened the likelihood that the
charge would be reduced.” Id.  The study showed that pretrial detention had a similar impact on
case outcomes in misdemeanor cases. See Phillips, Nonfelony Case Outcomes, supra note 180, at
5.  While the overall conviction rate in misdemeanor cases was 58%, only 50% of defendants
released prior to disposition were convicted, compared to a 92% conviction rate for defendants
detained to disposition. Id.
192. See Phillips, Nonfelony Case Outcomes, supra note 180, at 6–7; see also Phillips, Felony
Case Outcomes, supra note 180, at 5–6; McCoy, supra note 126, at 147.
193. See Chaudhuri, supra note 137, at 18; see also Howell, supra note 26, at 635; Phillips,
Felony Case Outcomes, supra note 180, at 7.
194. Chaudhuri, supra note 137, at 18.
195. Howell, supra note 26, at 635.
196. See Phillips, Felony Case Outcomes, supra note 180, at 7.
197. In 2009, there were 95,206 total criminal defendants who appeared in federal courts,
86,314 of which were convicted of the offense charged. Criminal Defendants Disposed of in U.S.
District Courts by Offense and Type of Disposition, Fiscal Year 2009, SOURCEBOOK CRIM. JUST.
STAT., http://www.albany.edu/sourceook/pdf/t5242009.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2014).  There
were 83,707 who pled guilty, representing almost 88% of the total number of defendants and
nearly 97% percent of the convicted defendants. Id.  A study of all the persons arrested in New
Jersey during a randomly chosen week in 2006 bore out similar statistics at the state level. See
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guilty is especially acute when a defendant knows that doing so will
lead to his release.198  More than simply affecting a case outcome, pre-
trial detention can actually be determinative, especially in the case of
an innocent defendant who decides to plead guilty rather than sit in
jail for several weeks awaiting trial.199  In addition to placing pressure
on a defendant to plead guilty, pretrial detention can affect the out-
come of a case by significantly inhibiting the defendant’s ability to
successfully defend themselves against the charges brought against
them.200  When a defendant is detained awaiting trial, he cannot per-
sonally meet with witnesses or collect evidence, and it is much more
difficult to take a prominent role in steering the course of his own
defense.201  Further, detention precludes a defendant from obtaining
employment in the period leading up to and continuing throughout his
trial, which forces a disproportionate number of detained defendants
to rely on public defenders rather than retained attorneys.202  The
budgetary constraints most public defenders face often severely limit
the investigative services they can offer clients, which undercuts their
ability to mount strong defenses.203
There are additional reasons that explain why pretrial detention
often leads to a more severe sentence for a defendant than he other-
wise would have received, regardless of the merits of the case.204  Un-
derstanding that detention can be used as leverage to encourage
defendants to plead guilty, prosecutors may be less willing to offer
plea bargains after arraignment.205  The inability to procure gainful
employment while detained also burdens a defendant’s ability to
prove to a judge that he is a productive member of society.206  Thus
the defendant is deprived of an argument by which he might sway the
judge to impose a less severe sentence.207  The effect of pretrial deten-
tion on the severity of a sentence can also extend to future cases in-
volving the defendant.  When a defendant pleads guilty to minor
McCoy, supra note 126, at 147–48.  Of the defendants who were detained until their case was
disposed, 71% pled guilty. Id. at 148.  Though 71% in itself represents a substantial majority, its
significance is brought even more into focus by the fact that 25% of those detained until disposi-
tion of their cases had all their charges dropped. Id.
198. Howell, supra note 26, at 642–43.
199. See id. at 642.
200. Chaudhuri, supra note 137, at 18.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See Phillips, Felony Case Outcomes, supra note 180, at 7–8; see also McCoy, supra note
126, at 147; Chaudhuri, supra note 137, at 18; Howell, supra note 26, at 635.
205. Phillips, Felony Case Outcomes, supra note 180, at 7.
206. Id.; see also Chaudhuri, supra note 137, at 18.
207. Phillips, Felony Case Outcomes, supra note 180, at 7.
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charges simply to bring his detention to an end, that plea becomes a
conviction on the defendant’s record.208  A record containing such
convictions can be the basis for a more severe sentence in a later
conviction.209
By significantly influencing the subsequent course of events in a
criminal case to the defendant’s detriment, pretrial detention burdens
the fairness the defendant is entitled to in the trial process.  Fairness is
supposed to be protected by the presumption of innocence, which is
still “the fundamental precept of the American criminal justice sys-
tem.”210  Allowing a state to deprive an individual of his freedom
before proving that he has committed a crime contravenes the concep-
tion of fairness embodied in the presumption of innocence.211  Thus,
even when pretrial detention does not affect the outcome of a case to
the defendant’s detriment, that defendant still suffers an abridgement
of a fundamental right simply from being detained despite never being
proven or adjudged guilty.212  Because an allegation that a person is
documented as a gang member in a law enforcement database signifi-
cantly increases the likelihood of pretrial detention,213 the allegation
itself is a burden on the defendant’s rights to a presumption of inno-
cence and a fair trial.
B. Which Level of Scrutiny?
Under a Fourteenth Amendment challenge, the standard by which
a state action is scrutinized is integral to the determination as to
whether the action is constitutional.  Under rationality review, state
action is presumed valid, and an action need only be rationally related
to a legitimate state interest to be upheld.214  Under strict scrutiny
analysis, however, state action will be upheld only if it is narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.215
1. Invidious Discrimination
The fact that gang databases contain the names of a disproportion-
ately high number of African-Americans and Latinos is insufficient to
trigger strict scrutiny in a racial discrimination challenge to the prac-
tice of alleging documentation in a gang database at a bail hearing.
208. See McCoy, supra note 126, at 147.
209. See id.
210. Chaudhuri, supra note 137, at 18.
211. See infra notes 226–229 and accompanying text.
212. See Phillips, Felony Case Outcomes, supra note 180, at 7.
213. See supra notes 168–188 and accompanying text.
214. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
215. Id.
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While state policies that classify individuals by race are subject to
strict scrutiny, a law is not unconstitutional simply because of its ra-
cially disproportionate impact alone.216  For strict scrutiny to apply,
“the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory
must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.”217  A
facially neutral law may be found unconstitutional if it is applied in an
invidious manner so as to effectively discriminate on the basis of race,
but a law that is “neutral on its face and serv[es] ends otherwise within
the power of government to pursue” is not invalid under the Four-
teenth Amendment “simply because it may affect a greater proportion
of one race than of another.”218
The policies prescribing the maintenance and uses of gang
databases are facially neutral, as the criteria for entering an individual
into a database contain no mention of race.219  Further, prosecutors
allege documentation in gang databases in furtherance of the goals of
incarcerating dangerous criminals and making communities safer.220
Although one could argue about the effectiveness of such a policy, a
state has the authority to pursue such goals.221  A challenge that the
practice is racially discriminatory would therefore only elicit rational-
ity review.
2. Infringement on Fundamental Rights
While the disparate impact of gang databases on African-Ameri-
cans and Latinos is insufficient to trigger strict scrutiny, the impact of
a prosecutor’s allegation at a bail hearing that the defendant is a docu-
mented gang member is significant under a constitutional challenge
because “[t]he right to a fair trial is a fundamental liberty secured by
the Fourteenth Amendment.”222  The presumption of innocence for
all criminal defendants is a basic component of the right to a fair
trial.223  Implementing the presumption of innocence requires courts
to take notice of factors that could potentially upset the fairness of the
216. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
217. Id. at 240.
218. Id. at 241–42.
219. See supra notes 75–81 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 168–169 and accompanying text.
221. Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80, 82 (1946) (“Protection of the safety of
persons is one of the traditional uses of the police power of the States.”).
222. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976).
223. Id.
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trial process.224  Deprivation of the right to bail is one such factor that
could eviscerate the presumption of innocence and fairness.225
The Eighth Amendment protects the presumption of innocence and
the right to a fair trial by prohibiting courts from requiring excessive
bail.226  The guarantee of reasonable bail safeguards the traditional
right to be free prior to conviction, which promotes fairness by al-
lowing a defendant to be unhampered in preparing a defense.227  The
Eighth Amendment protection also works to prevent the state from
punishing a criminal defendant before the defendant is actually con-
victed.228  The presumption of innocence and fairness would be fic-
tions without a right to reasonable bail.229
Bail has been predominately used to secure attendance at trial,230
and courts are required to determine bail based on factors relevant to
that purpose.231  However, the right to bail is not absolute, as the Su-
preme Court has stated “that when Congress has mandated detention
on the basis of a compelling interest other than prevention of flight,
. . . the Eighth Amendment does not require release on bail.”232  The
Eighth Amendment does require that judges only deny bail for the
strongest of reasons.233  While the right to bail is not absolute, the
Supreme Court has clarified that fairness is still a fundamental con-
cern at pretrial proceedings.234  Therefore, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s strictures must apply to any preliminary proceeding that
implicates fairness.235  A bail hearing is such a proceeding because of
224. Id.
225. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
226. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
227. Stack, 342 U.S. at 4.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Appleman, supra note 121, at 1328.
231. Stack, 342 U.S. at 5.
232. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754–55 (1987).  The Court upheld the 1984 Bail
Reform Act, in which Congress recognized protecting the community from a defendant’s future
dangerousness as a compelling interest justifying denial of bail. Id. at 751–55.  The Court stated
that pretrial detention under the Bail Reform Act is not penal, but rather regulatory. Id. at 747.
While this regulation deprives an individual of his strong interest in liberty, public safety from
dangerousness is sufficiently weighty to justify the deprivation. Id. at 750–51.
233. Harris v. United States, 404 U.S. 1232, 1232 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1971).
234. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309–11 (1973).  The Court acknowledged that
there are critical encounters involving the prosecution and the accused in pretrial proceedings
“where the results might well settle the accused’s fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere for-
mality.” Id. at 310.  Thus, for the purpose of determining an accused’s rights, these pretrial
events can be considered to be parts of the actual trial. Id.  The Court used this reasoning to
extend the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to all critical stages of the proceedings. Id. at
310–11.
235. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976).
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the profound effect a bail determination has on the outcome of a
given case.236
The Fourteenth Amendment’s dual guarantees of equal protection
of the laws and due process underscore the primary goal of the Amer-
ican judicial system—ensuring that “all people charged with crime
must, so far as the law is concerned, ‘stand on an equality before the
bar of justice in every American court.’”237  To effectuate this pur-
pose, state actions that pose a “probability of deleterious effects on
fundamental rights call[] for close judicial scrutiny.”238  Alleging that a
defendant is a documented gang member at a bail hearing is likely to
burden the defendant’s right to presumption of innocence and a fair
trial by increasing the likelihood of pretrial detention and, therefore,
should be reviewed under strict judicial scrutiny.
C. Strict Scrutiny
Under strict scrutiny, a prosecutor’s allegation that a defendant is a
documented gang member can only survive if it is narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling government interest that justifies the burden it
places on the defendant’s right to a fair trial.239  Therefore, it is neces-
sary to assess each government interest such an allegation might
advance.
1. The Government’s Interest in Securing Attendance at Trial
Securing attendance at trial has served as the traditional justifica-
tion for requiring bail.240  But the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
on requiring excessive bail mandates that a court fix bail strictly ac-
cording to standards that are relevant to assuring the defendant ap-
pears for trial.241  If a court requires bail in excess of what is
reasonably determined to achieve this purpose, then the defendant’s
236. See People v. Purcell, 758 N.E.2d 895, 898 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (holding that fundamental
fairness requires “placing the burden [on] the State to prove [at a bail hearing] that the accused’s
guilt is evident or that the presumption of such guilt is great” so as to justify denying bail).
237. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956) (plurality opinion) (quoting Chambers v. Flor-
ida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940)).
238. Estelle, 425 U.S. at 504.  The Supreme Court has used the term “close judicial scrutiny”
synonymously with the term “strict scrutiny.” Compare Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,
372 (1971) (stating “that classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race,
are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny” (emphasis added) (footnotes omit-
ted)), with Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 17 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that
“Graham v. Richardson . . . was the first case to explicitly conclude that alienage classifications,
like those based on race or nationality, would be subject to strict scrutiny” (emphasis added)).
239. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
240. Appleman, supra note 121, at 1328.
241. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951).
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Eighth Amendment right—a right fundamental to the fairness of the
trial—has been violated.242  Given that alleging that a defendant is a
documented gang member has a strong likelihood of leading to higher
bail,243 strict scrutiny requires determining whether consideration of
the allegation is necessary and narrowly tailored to achieve the inter-
est of securing attendance at trial.
To demonstrate that alleging documentation of gang membership is
necessary to the goal of securing attendance at trial, the state would
have to introduce evidence proving that individuals documented in
law enforcement gang databases are more inclined to jump bail.244
One method by which a state could make such a showing would be to
prove that alleged gang members possess individual characteristics
that make them less likely to appear for trial.245  While a person can
be entered into a gang database for meeting a number of criteria,
none of those criteria inherently bear on the probability that the per-
son would appear in court for trial.246
As an alternative to showing that alleged gang members possess in-
dividual characteristics that make them less likely to appear for trial, a
state could argue that membership in a specific gang, in and of itself,
increases the probability that a person will fail to attend court.247
However, the Supreme Court has refused to assume, without specific
evidence, that a defendant who is a member of a particular association
will flee a jurisdiction in obedience to a superior within that associa-
tion.248  Because gangs are highly decentralized and unorganized as-
sociations,249 it is unlikely that a prosecutor could present any
evidence indicating that a gang pressures members to jump bail.
242. Id.
243. See supra notes 168–188 and accompanying text.
244. If a person documented in a law enforcement database is no less likely to appear for trial
than a person not listed in a database as a gang member, then consideration of such an allegation
as a basis for increasing bail is wholly arbitrary.
245. An allegation of gang membership would be relevant to bail determination if the per-
sonal characteristics that lead to documentation in a gang database reflect a lesser probability
that a person will appear for trial, such as apathy or disdain toward the criminal justice
procedures.
246. See supra notes 75–81 and accompanying text.  Although a person can be entered into a
law enforcement database simply because he has certain tattoos, has been observed wearing
particular colors or style of dress, or has been photographed with particular people, it is difficult
to imagine that a judge would give any weight to that information in determining what amount
of bail will ensure the defendant’s appearance for trial.
247. This argument rests on the premise that membership in a gang, rather than any character-
istic personal to the defendant, inversely affects the probability that a defendant will appear for
trial.
248. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1951).
249. See supra notes 31–43 and accompanying text.
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In cases in which a defendant faces the possibility of an enhanced
sentence because of his alleged gang affiliation, a state may argue that
considering his documentation as a suspected gang member is neces-
sary to determine the amount of bail that will reasonably assure pres-
ence at trial.250  While the severity of the sentence the defendant
potentially stands to serve may be relevant to determining the amount
of bail that would secure his trial attendance, it is a factor that cannot
be considered on its own.251  Rather, a court must also consider the
strength of the prosecution’s case to assess whether a potentially se-
vere sentence will increase the likelihood that the defendant will not
attend trial.252  Given judges’ heavy reliance on gang database lists,253
despite the serious questions regarding the accuracy of the lists,254 fac-
toring sentence severity into the bail determination based solely on
documentation of gang affiliation discounts the difficulty the prosecu-
tor may face of proving actual gang membership at trial.   A less preju-
dicial and less restrictive means of calculating how a potential
sentence enhancement affects the likelihood that the defendant will
attend trial is to only allow the prosecution to offer the evidence of
gang membership, without introducing the defendant’s documented
status at the bail hearing.255  Because the Federal Rules of Evidence—
which exclude evidence that is substantially more prejudicial than pro-
bative256—do not apply in pretrial bail hearings,257 it is essential to
protect a defendant’s right to a fair trial against allegations of gang
membership documentation at bail hearings under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s strictures of equal protection and due process.
An allegation that a defendant is listed in a law enforcement
database is neither narrowly tailored nor necessary to achieving the
interest of ensuring that the defendant attends trial.  Therefore, that
250. One could argue that a defendant facing a severe punishment would be more likely to
flee the jurisdiction and forfeit bail in an amount that would secure trial attendance than would a
defendant facing lesser punishment.  As to the defendant facing the more severe punishment,
assuring attendance at trial requires raising the amount of bail to the point at which the defen-
dant is no longer willing to forfeit such a large sum of money.
251. See Stack, 342 U.S. at 6 (holding that “infer[ring] from the fact of indictment alone a
need for bail in an unusually high amount is an arbitrary act”).
252. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) (holding that “courts must carefully
guard against dilution of the principle that guilt is to be established by probative evidence”).
253. Wright, supra note 70, at 117.
254. See supra notes 109–120 and accompanying text.
255. The allegation that a person is listed in a gang database is unfairly prejudicial.  Prohibit-
ing a prosecutor from alleging a person’s documentation would force the judge to determine the
probability that the defendant will face an enhanced sentence solely on probative evidence.
256. FED. R. EVID. 403.
257. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (2012).
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interest cannot justify the burden the practice places on a defendant’s
presumption of innocence and right to a fair trial.
2. The Government’s Interest in Protecting the Public from Danger
A state could also uphold the practice of alleging gang membership
documentation at bail hearings if it can show that doing so is neces-
sary and narrowly tailored to keep dangerous defendants from being
released back into the community.  The Supreme Court held in United
States v. Salerno that the government has a legitimate and compelling
interest in preventing arrested persons from committing crimes.258
The Court stated that this interest is at its greatest when the state can
show that the arrestee presents a danger to the community.259  How-
ever, in O’Connor v. Donaldson, the Court held that the government
may not confine a nondangerous person.260  The Court clarified in
O’Connor that the Constitution does not tolerate depriving a person
of his physical liberty based on “[m]ere public intolerance or animos-
ity.”261  Because dangerousness is the only constitutional justification
for detaining a defendant pretrial without bail, the inquiry should turn
on whether alleging documentation as a suspected gang member is
narrowly tailored to achieving the protection of the community from
dangerous defendants.
To pass the narrow tailoring requirement, a state would have to
prove that documentation in a criminal database as a gang member
equates with dangerousness.262  Many of the criteria governing entry
into gang databases are not confined to personal characteristics bear-
ing on an individual’s dangerousness.263  Therefore, for evidence of a
defendant’s gang affiliation to be interpreted as evidence of danger-
ousness, a court would have to assume that gang membership, in and
of itself, is probative of dangerousness.  A judge who infers this makes
the same mistake as the general public of falsely assuming that most
gang members are hardened criminals who pose a uniquely dangerous
threat to their communities.  Further, such an assumption requires
258. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749 (1987).
259. Id. at 750.
260. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975).
261. Id. at 575.
262. Overinclusiveness is fatal to an argument of narrow tailoring. See, e.g., Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 121 (1991) (holding
that the Son of Sam law was significantly overinclusive, and therefore not narrowly tailored to
achieving the stated government interest).
263. See supra notes 75–81 and accompanying text.  A person can easily be identified as a
suspected gang member because of his style of dress, tattoos, appearance in photographs with
suspected gang members, and a number of other factors.  Yet, none of those factors indicate that
the person is dangerous.
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“pil[ing] inference upon inference” to equate gang affiliation with
dangerousness, a tactic the Supreme Court rejected in United States v.
Lopez.264
Even if evidence of gang affiliation is probative of dangerousness,
inadequate purging procedures render gang database lists overinclu-
sive as a means of demonstrating that a defendant poses a danger.265
Gang databases often contain the names of former gang members
who are no longer active because the requirements for removing
names cannot keep pace with the constant fluidity of gang member-
ship, and often purging procedures are ignored altogether.266  While a
state could argue that leaving a gang does not diminish the degree of
danger that a former member poses to the community, that argument
is contradicted by existing research.267  The sharp decline in crime that
typically takes place after a person leaves a gang shows that databases’
inclusion of former members makes them overinclusive for the pur-
pose of determining whether an individual poses a danger to the com-
munity.268  Therefore, protection of the public from dangerous
arrestees cannot justify the practice of alleging documentation of gang
membership at bail hearings against a Fourteenth Amendment
challenge.
3. The Government’s Interest in Deterring Gang Membership and
Gang Activity
In addition to the typical government interests furthered by bail
considerations, a state could argue that considering a defendant’s sta-
tus as a documented gang member is necessary to generally deterring
gang membership and gang activity.269  However, as with other possi-
ble state interests, alleging gang documentation is not narrowly tai-
lored to achieve the interest.
Because gang databases erroneously include the names of non-gang
members, subjecting defendants documented as suspected gang mem-
bers to increased bail and pretrial detention—as a means to deterring
264. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).
265. See supra notes 109–120 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 114–120 and accompanying text.
267. See GREENE & PRANIS, supra note 7, at 47 (stating that research shows gang members
only commit higher rates of offenses during the years in which they are actively involved in the
gang).
268. See id. at 47.
269. The state could argue that an individual would be less likely to join a gang if he knew that
the affiliation would increase the likelihood of pretrial detention if charged with a crime.  Simi-
larly, the state could contend that a gang member who knew that he would face a high
probability of being detained pretrial when charged with a crime would be less likely to engage
in criminal conduct for fear of pretrial detention.
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gang membership and activity—constitutes an overinclusive classifica-
tion.270  There is a substantial possibility that this practice, by leading
to higher bail and pretrial detention for a defendant incorrectly docu-
mented as a gang member, would burden the right to a fair trial of an
individual not intended to fall within the scope of the practice.  This is
the type of overinclusiveness that dooms policies and state actions
under heightened judicial scrutiny.271  The fact that there are already
sentence-enhancing guidelines to punish and deter gang members
from committing crimes suggests that alleging gang documentation at
bail hearings is not the least restrictive means to accomplish this goal,
unless a state could advance specific statistical data proving that the
practice has an additional deterrent effect.272  Furthermore, there is
evidence that consideration of such allegations at bail hearings might
actually promote gang activity.273
Alleging that a defendant is a documented gang member as a justifi-
cation for raising bail is not narrowly tailored to achieving any com-
pelling state interest.  Therefore, the practice should be prohibited as
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of due process
of law and equal protection of the laws.
IV. IMPACT
Prohibiting a prosecutor from alleging, or a judge from considering,
that a defendant is listed in a gang database would protect the right to
a fair trial as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.  While law
enforcement agencies could continue to use databases to maintain
records and learn more about the problems gangs pose in this country,
excluding the lists contained therein of suspected gang members from
bail consideration may actually increase the effectiveness of bail de-
nial and sentence enhancements as gang suppression tactics.
270. See supra notes 109–120 and accompanying text.
271. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 121 (1991) (holding that the Son of Sam law was significantly overinclusive, and therefore
not narrowly tailored to achieving the stated government interest).
272. See Brown, supra note 53, at 322.
273. See GREENE & PRANIS, supra note 7, at 79 (suggesting that incarceration actually
strengthens gang ties).  By increasing the amount of bail and likelihood of incarceration, alleging
that a person is a documented gang member could increase the chance that that person will
remain an active gang member instead of withdrawing from gang activity. Id.
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A. Upholding the “Fair Trial” Guarantee of the
Fourteenth Amendment
While detaining a defendant without bail is justified if a court deter-
mines that the defendant poses a threat of danger,274 fairness should
dictate that such a determination be based on evidence that actually
reflects on the defendant’s dangerous character.  Prosecutors and
judges heavily rely on the accuracy of law enforcement lists of sus-
pected gang members as the basis for determining defendants to be
dangerous and withholding bail.275  The fairness of heavy reliance on
such evidence is called into question by the flaws in the creation and
maintenance of such lists.276  Assuming that a particular defendant
listed in a database is actually a gang member, unquestioning reliance
on that evidence alone to determine that the defendant is dangerous
simply gives effect to the common misperceptions about gangs and
gang members.277  Doing so ignores data suggesting that “[t]he seri-
ousness and extent of criminal involvement varies greatly among gang
members.”278
Rather than rely on the prejudicial impact that an allegation of gang
affiliation carries, prosecutors should be required to introduce the tan-
gible evidence that led to an individual’s entry onto a gang database
list in order to demonstrate that the person is dangerous.  Such evi-
dence would better provide defendants a fair opportunity to rebut
such accusations and judges the ability to make just determinations.279
Forcing a prosecutor to state at a bail hearing that the defendant has
been observed associating with suspected gang members affords the
defendant an opportunity to rebut or destroy the inference that this
piece of evidence justifies pretrial detention.280  Likewise, hearing this
specific piece of evidence allows the judge to understand and evaluate
the prosecutor’s basis for alleging that the defendant is dangerous.281
274. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (2012).
275. Wright, supra note 186, at 117.
276. See supra notes 109–120 and accompanying text.
277. GREENE & PRANIS, supra note 7, at 51.
278. Id.
279. See supra notes 142–146 and accompanying text (discussing how the paucity of informa-
tion at a bail hearing often precludes the defendant from rebutting evidence that he is dangerous
and the judge from making a fair determination).
280. A defendant can explain why he has been observed associating with suspected gang
members while posing no danger himself.  But a defendant cannot explain why he is listed in a
gang database despite not being a dangerous person if he does not know why he was entered
into the database in the first place.
281. Because there is a wide range of reasons for which a person can be entered into a gang
database, the judge cannot decide how database documentation is relevant to dangerousness
unless he knows the specific reasons a particular defendant was entered into such a database.
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Promoting fairness at this preliminary stage of a case will facilitate
fairness throughout by permitting pretrial release of nondangerous
defendants, allowing the final disposition of cases to turn on the
strength of evidence rather than the pressures of pretrial detention.
B. Addressing Racial Disparities
Not only will prohibiting prosecutors from alleging that a defendant
is documented in a gang database at bail hearings advance the funda-
mental right to a fair trial, it would also be a step toward rectifying
racial disparities in the criminal justice system.  The overrepresenta-
tion of certain minority groups—especially African-Americans—in
gang databases mirrors the overrepresentation of those same groups
in the nation’s prisons.282  Statistics like this make it easy to see why
there has long been resentment toward law enforcement in poor, ur-
ban, and minority communities.283  Eliminating a practice that unfairly
and disproportionately affects minority defendants would be a mea-
sure of progress in eliminating racial inequity and, potentially, restor-
ing credibility to the criminal justice system.
C. Continued Use of Gang Databases as a Law Enforcement Tool
While prohibiting allegations of gang affiliation at bail hearings
would promote the right to a fair trial and reduce racial inequity in the
criminal justice system, law enforcement agencies should continue to
use gang databases as a means of collecting and disseminating infor-
mation.  Forcing a prosecutor to introduce the evidence contained
within a gang database regarding a defendant, as opposed to simply
alleging that the defendant is listed as a suspected gang member, will
incentivize a law enforcement agency to develop better procedures for
entering and maintaining information in the database.  Upgrading
such procedures could include more training for patrol officers regard-
ing how to conduct field interviews and record information,284 refining
the criteria for entering an individual into a database as a suspected
gang member,285 and implementing and complying with stringent
purging procedures to keep database lists up to date.286  As law en-
282. In 2010, the incarceration rate in the United States for black individuals was 2,207 per
every 100,000, while it was only 380 per every 100,000 for white individuals. U.S. Incarcerations
Rates by Race & Ethnicity, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, http://www.prisonpolicy.org/graphs/
raceinc.html (last visited May 30, 2014).
283. Kami Chavis Simmons, New Governance and the “New Paradigm” of Police Accountabil-
ity: A Democratic Approach to Police Reform, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 411 (2010).
284. See supra notes 109–113 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 75–113 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 114–120 and accompanying text.
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forcement agencies improve their systems of collecting and maintain-
ing records, that information can be used to develop legislation and
law enforcement tactics that more effectively suppress violent crime,
which is policymakers’ primary goal with respect to the war on
crime.287
D. A More Effective Deterrent to Violent Crime
Precluding consideration of gang affiliation documentation at bail
hearings may make pretrial detention a more effective tool for reduc-
ing violent crime.  The underlying goal of anti-gang measures is to ad-
dress violent crime.288  Only allowing evidence that reflects on a
defendant’s violent and dangerous character at a bail hearing will
more directly advance the government’s interest in addressing violent
crime.289  Meanwhile, eliminating pretrial detention for defendants
who are not dangerous—even if they are gang members—will reduce
the likelihood that defendants charged with minor offenses are con-
victed and sentenced to prison.290
Keeping more defendants out of prisons will decrease the instances
of “trapping” young people in a life of crime.291  This argument is sup-
ported by evidence that the majority of young gang members remain
involved for periods of less than a year, but incarceration often
“weaken[s] the capacity of . . . individuals to lead law-abiding lives”
and strengthens individuals’ gang ties.292  Therefore, bail procedures
that provide for pretrial release and increase a defendant’s chances of
remaining out of prison should increase the likelihood that the defen-
dant will sever any gang affiliation and avoid criminal conduct in the
future.
V. CONCLUSION
For all of the deep-seated fears regarding street gangs, there is still
much to learn about these organizations.  Gang databases can be a
useful tool for law enforcement agencies to collect information about
the relationship between gangs and criminal activity; however gang
members should not be targeted for punishment disproportionate to
287. Beres & Griffith, supra note 5, at 753–54; see also Brown, supra note 53, at 295.
288. Beres & Griffith, supra note 5, at 753–54; see also Brown, supra note 53, at 295.
289. See supra notes 263–264 and accompanying text (discussing the fallacy in assuming that
evidence of gang membership is evidence of a violent and dangerous character).
290. See Phillips, Felony Case Outcomes, supra note 180, at 5.
291. GREENE & PRANIS, supra note 7, at 79 (explaining how “incarcerating the ‘wrong’ indi-
viduals risks trapping youth who would otherwise have outgrown gang activity in a life of
crime”).
292. Id.
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the portion of crimes they commit and the share of societal harm for
which they are responsible.  Targeting gangs should not be done in
furtherance of political agendas.  Additionally, targeting gangs should
not serve to exacerbate racial disparities in the American criminal jus-
tice system.
The practice of introducing evidence at bail hearings of defendants’
documentation in gang databases not only fosters these regrettable
social realities, but it is also unconstitutional.  Bail determinations
have a profound and detrimental effect on defendants’ opportunity to
receive fair trials, as pretrial detention can both hamper a defendant’s
ability to assist in his defense and place significant pressure on a de-
fendant to plead guilty.  Given the inapplicability of the rules of evi-
dence at bail hearings, consideration of gang database documentation
at this stage of the criminal justice process is fundamentally unfair.
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to a fair trial; there-
fore, the Fourteenth Amendment should preclude the use of gang
databases to undercut that right.
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